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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STA TE OF UTAH
WAYNE GARFF CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC ,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MAURICE RICHARDS IWD MRS. MAURICE RICHARDS
MYRTLE BISEL, et al,
'
Defendants and Respondents,
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS, A Law partnership,
and MAURICE RICHARDS,
Third-party Plaintiffs, Cross-Complainants,
and Res po nde nts,

Case No. 19278

v.
WAYNE GARFF CON STRUCTJl).J COMP/WY, INC.,
WAYNE GARFF, individually,
NORTHE!l'J DEVELOPMENT COMP/WY, and
THREE FOUNTAINS OF NORTH OGDEN, INC.,
Third-party Defendants, Cross-Defendants,
and Appellants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed a Motion under Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to set aside a Judgment which was entered against them
in their absence and after their then counsel had infonned them that the
matter had been fully settled by all parties dismissing all claims,
counterclaims and cross-claims.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court denied Appellants'
and Appellants'

MOTION FOR REHEARING ON

MOTION

TI-l!RD

TO

SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal
which denied
MOTION FOR

Appellants'
REHEARING

MOTION

ON

TI-IIRD

of the decision
TO

SET ASIDE

PARTY

of the District Court

JUDGMENT and Appellant's

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO

SET ASIDE

DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The adversaries

in this matter are Maurice

Richards, his

present

wife who is the fonner Myrtle (Susie) Bisel, (R. 353) and the legal
of which he is a partner,
The Appellants,

firm

Richards, Caine & Richards, as Respondents.

Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc.,

are former clients of Maurice Richards and his law firm.
dant's Exhibit 1, 2 and 10)

( R. 70, Defen-

Named by Maurice Richards as

Third-party

Defendants and CrossDefendants are two other Companies, Northern Development Company and Three Fountains of North Ogden, Inc., that were, during
the time in question, clients of Maurice Richards and his law firm. (R.
70, Defendant's Exhibit 2 and 10)
The Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint in this case (R. 1-13) was filed
on October 28, 1977 ( R. 1), after having been served on Defendant Maurice
Richards on October 21, 1977 (R. 15).

A Default Certificate was entered

against Defendant Maurice Richards on Monday, November 21, 1977 (R. 17),
and a hearing was set for a Default Judgment to be taken the same day
(R. 16, 300-308), as no responsive pleading had been filed.
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However, John

Caine, an

associate of Defendant Maurice

Richards,

happened to

be

in

Court at the time set for the Default hearing (R. 301) and upon his representations that he would see that responsive pleadings were filed by Wednesday, November 23, 1977 (R. 16, 302, 307) the Default Judgment was not
granted (R. 307-308).

Responsive pleadings were not filed until Tuesday,

November 29, 1977 ( R.18-37).
The first trial for this case was set for October 26, 1978.

This was

evidently a non-jury trial setting which was striken by the Court because
a Jury Demand was filed by Appellants' then counsel on October 12, 1978.
(R. 52, 113)
The second trial

setting

for January

22,

1979 ( R.

278), and the

third trial setting for April 26, 1979 (R. 278) were continued because of
medical problems allegedly suffered by Respondent Maurice Richards (R. 5859).
A fourth trial setting for September 17, 1979, was continued due to
three criminal cases and two civil cases pending trial ahead of this case
with only two judges being available for trial.

(R. 62)

A fifth trial setting for January 7 1980, (R. 114 and 122) (R. 278
indicates January 17, 1979, but at least the year must be in error in
that the prior trial setting was September 17, 1979) was continued due to
the continuing medical problems of Respondent Maurice Richards (R. 114)
or serious i 11 ness of Stan Adams ( R. 122).
A sixth trial

setting

for

April

10, 1980,

was continued

because

"Gary Walker was not noticed for this trial, and the Court ruled that the
case cannot proceed". ( R. 50)

Gary Walker was the President of Northern

Development Company (R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 4) and Three Fountains of
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North Ogden, Inc. (R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 7, ARTICLE VIII).

He too

had personally been a client of Maurice Richards. (R. 321, lines 24 and
25, and 322, lines 1-4)

Respondent's Counsel also alleged that an addi-

tional objection to the trial proceeding on the sixth setting was that
the Judge

had

played

On July 22,

handball

with Appellant

1980, Appellant sent a letter

Wayne

Garff.

(R.

123)

to his then attorney

requesting him to settle the case, if Respondents would agree, by both
parties dismissing their causes of action.

(R.

108)

This

offer was

conveyed to Respondent's attorney by a letter dated July 25, 1980.

(R.

109)
Shortly after the above offer of settlement was made, the seventh
tri a 1 setting for August 11, 1980,

was continued i ndefi ni te 1y at the

request of counsel for Respondents on the ground that Respondent Maurice
Richards would be outside of the United States. (R. 65-66)
On February 10, 1982, (R. 278) nearly two years after the last conti nuance, notice of an eighth trial setting, for June 7, 1982, was sent
to Appellants'

then

Counsel.

On February 16,

1982,

Appellants'

then

Counsel wrote to John Caine, one of the partners in the Respondent law
firm of Richards, Caine & Richards and after noting receipt of the June
7, 1982 trial setting, asked:
Should I prepare or should we dismiss.
( R. 110)

Please advise.

While no written response was received to this letter, according to
the Affidavit of Appellants' then Counsel, he did have contact four or
five times, both by telephone and in person, about Appellants' offer to
dismiss.

He was advised that if he did not hear to the contrary, he

could consider the case would be dismissed.
4

(R. 104)

He heard nothing

to the contrary until

Appellant cal led him on December 4, 1982, to ask

about a garnishment that had been served on Pat Blair.
Jn the AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN

T.

CAINE,

( R. 155 and 243)

Mr. Caine denies discussing a

settlement with Appellants' fonner Counsel or that he received the letter
(R. 110) Mr. Adams sent to him. (R. 136)
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

In his AFFIDAVIT OF COLNSEL IN

SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-

SIOOS OF LAW /IND JUDGMENT Respondent's Counsel

neither acknowledges or

denies receiving the letter (R. 109) Mr. Adams sent to him.

He does

state he received an "oral communication" of such an offer, communicated
it to his clients
telephone.

who

refused

same and then

so

advised Mr.

Adams

by

( R. 123)

The eighth trial

setting on June 7, 1982, proceeded even though Mr.

Garff had been informed by his then Counsel that the case had been settled by both parties dropping their claims and that there would be no
trial. ( R. 105, 152 and 244)
Jn order to make

sure

asked his then Attorney,

of his understanding, Mr. Garff personally

Stanley

s.

Adams, on the very day of the trial,

June 7, 1982, if he was to go to trial.

He was told not to worry,"! am

sure it is settled and there will be no trial".

(R. 152)

The FINDINGS OF FACT f>ND CONCLUSJOO OF LAW !'>ND JUDGMENT were submitted
to the Court in August, 1982, and signed on August 19, 1982. (R. 76 and
139)

A copy of this JUDGMENT was not served upon Apellant or his attor-

ney until

September 21,

Mr. Adams on

1982.

September 21,

September 23, 1982.
employee of Mr.

(R.

125-126, 'If 23)

1982, was received by a Sylvia Martinez on

(R. 127 and 139)

Adams'

The copy mailed to

Sylvia Martinez was a receptionist

landlord at the Valley
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Bank Towers Building and

not of Mr. Adams.
fied mail

She had no authority from Mr. Adams to accept certi-

for Mr. Adams.

Mr.

Adams was on vacation from September 20

until September 27, 1982, and had no knowledge that a Judgment had been
entered in the matter until Mr.
that had been

Garff called him about a Garnishment

served on Mrs. Patricia (Pat)

Blair.

(R.

78

and

243)

It was not until December 4, 1982, that Mr. Garff received his first
hint that something was wrong when he was told by Mrs. Patricia Blair
that she had received a writ of Garnishment against Wayne Garff Construction Co.

He then cal led Mr. Adams and asked him to investigate.

It was

not until December 13, 1982, that he actually learned that a Judgment had
been taken against him.

(R. 155-156)

Appellants' MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT (R. 79-80) was mailed December 21, 1982, and received by the Clerk of the Court on December 22,
1982.

It was, therefore, received by the Clerk nine (9) days after Mr.

Garff actually learned of the Judgment

against him and

only eighteen

(18) days after receiving the first information that would even cause
him to suspect there was a Judgment against him.
In the Court's March 24, 1983, MEMORAADUM DEC! SION, the Court noted
that:
. . Under the facts as stated by plaintiffs affidavit, it could
possibly be construed there was excusable neglect for not appearing
at the time the trial was set. The problem with plaintiff's present
m?tion is that judgment was entered on August 19, 1982, and filed
with the clerk on August 23, 1982, and the plaintiff and his attorney
received notice of judgment on September 23, 1982. However, they
did not file the motion to set aside the judgment until December 22,
1982, s?me four months after the date of entry of judgment, even
some thirty days after the writ of garnishment had been is sued
against the plaintiffs. Even though plaintiff had some cause for
excu~able neglect to set aside the judgment, and it appears there is
possible grounds for the same if you rely upon their affidavits.
They still fail to meet the requirements under Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil procedure with (sic) provides that:
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"The motion shal 1 be made within a reasonable
not more than three months after the judment,
ceeding (sic) was entered or taken".

time .•• and
order, pro-

The Plaintiff has not filed the motion timely under Rule 60(b)
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and this motion to set aside
the default judgment will be denied . . . (R. 139)
Based on
Counsel

the

Court's

MEMOfW.lDUM DEC! SION

dated

March

24,

1983,

for Third-Party Plaintiffs filed their proposed FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, .Al.JD ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT which
was signed by the Court on April 11, 1983.

(R. 146)

Appellant Wayne Garff first contacted his present Counsel
ing of the

Court's

decision

MOTION FOR

REHEARING

ON

on

April

THIRD-PARTY

14,

1983.

Counsel

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION

on learn-

prepared his
TO

SET

ASIDE

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( R. 149-150), supporting AFF!DAVI T of Wayne B. Garff ( R.
151-156), and ORDER STAYING EXECUTION (R. 179-180) on Saturday, April
1983, in order to meet the 10 day deadline under Rule 59 (b) and (e)
the Utah Rules of Civil
Rules of Civil

Procedure.

16,
of

Pursuant to Rule 62 (b) of the Utah

Procedure, the Court signed said ORDER STAYWG EXECUTION

and copies of said ORDER,

MOTION, and AFFIDAVIT were served on opposing

Counsel on Monday,

18,

April

1983,

by personal

delivery to his

served

his MOTION

IN

office.

( R. 150 and 180)
Counsel for Respondents

OP POSITION

TO MOTION

FOR REHEARING ( R. 181-183), AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING ON

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION

184-194), AFFIDAVIT

OF

CO~SEL

TO

SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( R.

(R.197-198),

AFFIDAVIT

OF

LINDA

MOORE

(R. 199-200), and AFFIDAVIT of JP-N CHASE (R. 195-196), by mail on Friday,
May 6, 1983. (R. 183)
The District Court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION denying Appellants'

MOTION FOR REHEARING ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT on June 6, 1983, and copies were mailed to Counsel on June 7, 1983.
(R. 223)

Respondent's Counsel mailed a copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR REHEARING AND

ORDER

SETTING ASIDE

Counsel on June 8, 1983. (R. 281)

STAY OF EXCUTION

to Appellants'

Appellants' NOTICE OF APPEAL (R. 284-

285) was filed on June 21, 1983.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST BE CORRELATED AND
INTERPRETED IN CONTEXT WITH OTHER RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PARTICULARLY RULE 2.9 WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND DECREES, OF THE RULES OF
PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND CIRCUIT COURTS DF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Paragraphs {a) and (b)
Decrees of the

Rules

of

of Rule 2.9 Written Orders,

Practice

in

the

Judgments, and

District Courts

and

Circuit

Courts of the State of Utah provides:
{a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the parties obtaining
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as
the court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment
or decree in confonnity with the ruling.
{b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders
shall be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of
objections thereto shall be sumitted to the court and counsel within
five (5) days after service. (Emphasis added)
It is absolutely clear in this case, both from Paragraph 23 of the
February 2, 1983, AFFIDAVIT OF COLNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT {R.
125-126) and the Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION (R. 139), that both of the
above cited sections of Rule 2.9 were flagrantly violated and/or ignored
by Respondent's Counsel, Mr. Gale.

The trial

in this matter took place

on June 7, 1982, and the proposed judgment should have been filed with

8

the court by June 22, 1982.

Copies of the proposed Findings and Judgment

should have been served on Mr. Adams before they were presented to the
Court for signature.

However, as can be seen from the signed FINDINGS

OF FACT /\ND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT dated August 19, 1982 (R.
76), Mr. Gale did not file this document with the Court until
some two (2) months after the trial.
August 19,

1982,

September 21,

but Mr.

1982,

August,

The Court signed the Judgment on

Gale waited more

than another month,

until

after Mr. Garff' s one month to appeal the Judgment

under Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had expired, before
mailing a copy to Mr. Adams. ( R. 125-126)
The copy arrived
where Mr.

Adams

receptionist for

on

September 23,

1982,

at the

rents an office while Mr. Adams
Mr.

Adams landlord,

without

office building

was on

any

vacation.

authority

from

A
Mr.

Adams signed for the copy but never personally brought the copy to Mr.
Adams attention.

Mr. Adams did not learn about the Judgment against Mr.

Garff until Mr. Garff called him upon learning about the Garnishment on
December 4,

1982.

(R.

155,

156 and 243)

Thereafter, on December 22,

1982, within 18 days of the date Mr. Garff first received information
that would give him any

reason to

believe that there was a judgment

against him, and within three (3) months of the date the copy of the
judgment was signed for by an unauthorized person (R. 127 and 243, '4)
Plaintiff filed his MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT.

(R. 79-80)

Under such circumstances, it should be obvious to the Court that had
Mr. Gale served copies of his proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW /IND JUDGMENT upon Mr. Adams _before he filed them with the Court
and within fifteen (15) days of the June 7, 1982, trial, then Appellants'
9

MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT would have been made in June rather than in
December.
But most important, it should be cl ear to the Court that the requirement of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the
motion be made within three months after the judgment was entered must
be correlated and taken in context of section (b) of Rule 2.9, supra,
which requires that the Findings and Judgment "shall be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature".
The whole notion, basis, foundation and reason for Rule 60(b) is to
be able to challenge a Judgment, default or otherwise.
lenge a Judgment if one does not know about it!

How can one chal-

Therefore, notice of the

Judgment must be the key date from which the three months required by
Rule 60(b) is calculated, particularly where Counsel for the party who
is awarded the Judgment fails to serve a copy of the Findings and Judgment
on opposing Counsel as required by Rule 2.9, supra.
The failure of Respondent's Counsel to comply with Rule 2.9 cannot
be excused on the grounds that this was a default Judgment as he himself
noted in his MOTI(}J IN OPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING that:
Garff and his present attorney continue to designate the action
taken as a default judgment, when in fact a judgment was taken after
a trial on the issues and the merits of this case.
(R. 182)
Unless copies of a judgment are served on opposing counsel, all
counsel who obtains a judgment under circumstances such as existed in
this case need do is wait over three months after he has obtained his
judgment before he attempts to collect the judgment, as was done in this
case.

The party against whom the Judgment was taken will then be denied

any relief.

In other words, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce10

dure

contemplat~__ that

notice

that Judgment was taken when it requires that a Motion to Set

Aside_t_~Judgment

this

the party against whom the Judgment is taken has

be brought within three months.

When understood in

light, the requirement is that the motion be brought within three

months

o_!_~t_i_~and

has been met by Appellant in this case even if the

court does impute the receipt of a copy of the Judgment by a receptionist
of Mr. Adams' landlord to Mr. Adams and thus on to Mr.
Mr. Garff.
(R. 127)

Adams' client,

The receptionist signed for the copy on September 23, 1982.
The Appellants' Motion was filed by mail

on December 21, 1982.

( R. 80)
POINT 11
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE
IN THE

DISTRICT

Section (b)

COURTS

AND

CIRCUIT

COURTS

OF

THE

STATE

OF

UTAH

of Rule 2.8 of the RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT

COURTS AND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH states:
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten (10) days after service of the motion, a statement of
answering points and authorities and counter affidavits.
In his MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING Counsel
Respondents moved the District Court " ... for an
the Motion

for

for the

immediate dismissal

Rehearing ... and for $2 ,500.00 for their legal

fees

of
and

costs incurred through the attempts of Wayne Garff to delay execution of
the judgment heretofore entered by this Court." (R. 181-182) Thus Respondents and

their counsel

dramatically

demostrated

their propensity

for

outrageous over-reaching by seeking such substantial attorney's fees for
their efforts in submitting a response that was

filed on May 6, 1983,

eight (8) days after it was due under said Rule 2.8.
11

The only reason cited by the District Court for denying Appellants'
MOTION TO

SET ASIDE JUDGMENT was that it was not filed within the time

required by Rule 60 (b) and yet the Court accepted Respondent's MOTION IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING, AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
REHEARING ON THIRD-PAR1Y DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT,
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL, AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA MOORE, and AFFIDAVIT OF JAN CHASE
eight (8) days after they were required by Rule 2.8.
demand that Respondents be held to the

Fairness and equity

same technical

compliance with

the Rules of Procedure and Practice that are required of Appellant.

In

fact, Appellants should in fairness and equity be excused from the requirement of Rule 60(b) to file thier MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT within
three months of the date it was entered by the Court for the simple reason that they had no actua 1 kn owl edge that there was a judgment against
them until

December 13, 1982, after the three months

from the date of

signing by the Court had passed.
Appellants did in fact make their motion within nine (9)
receiving actual

notice;

Appellants' MOTION

TO

whereas, the Respondents

SET ASIDE

days of

failed to respond to

DEFAULT JUDGMENT within

the ten

( 10)

days required under Rule 2.8 even though Appellants' Motion was personally delivered to the

office of

Respondents' MOTION IN
its accompanying

Counsel

(R.

150 and 180).

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR REHEARING together with

affidavits

denied as untimely.

Respondents'

should

have,

therefore,

been

striken

and

Had the Court striken and denied Respondents' Motion,

Appell ants' Motion would have stood unopposed (just as Respondents

were

unopposed at the June 7,

been

1982 Tri al)

and would have

granted (just as Judgment was granted to Respondents'
12

necessarily

on June 7, 1982).

Appellants also note that at the November 21,

1977 hearing for a

Default Judgment against Respondent Maurice Richards, the District Court
granted said

Respondent two (2)

responsive pleadings.

additional days in which to

submit his

(R. 16, 302, lines 7 and 8, and 307, lines 20-23)

At that time his answer was already eleven (11) days late.

Respondents

then took eight (8) more days to file their responsive pleadings (R. 1826), but the Di strict Court still

accepted

them even though they were

filed six (6) days beyond the two (2) day extension.
The great latitude the District Court gave Respondents to file their
Answer and responsive
FINDINGS OF

pleadings nineteen (19)

days late;

to file their

FACT IWD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IWD JUDGMENT approximately two

(2) months after the June 7,
submitted within
opposing counsel;

fifteen

1982 hearing (when they should have been

(15)

days)

first

and to file their MOTION IN

REHEARING eight (8) days late, all
dents for the late filings,
cation of the

without

submitting

them

OPPOSITION TO MOTION

to
FOR

without any explanation from Respon-

stands in sharp contrast to the rigid appli-

time limit under Rule 60(b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure which the District Court applied against Appellants in spite
of Appellants' explanations for filing their MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
at the time they did and the Court's finding that the facts as stated in
Appellants' affidavit

could

possibly

be

construed

as

excusable

neglect ... " (R. 139).
PO INT I I I
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT BY A RECEPT!tlJIST AT THE OFFICE BUILDING
WHERE APPELLANTS' ATTO~EY HAD AN OFFICE SHOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO APPELLIWTS' COUNSEL AND CERTAINLY NOT TO APPELLANTS WHO IN FACT NEVER RECEIVED
N0 TICE OF THE J UDGME NT.
While Appellants acknowledge that notice to Appellants'
13

counsel

is

imputed to Appellants, Appellants submit that notice received by someone
other than Appellants' counsel, such as a receptionist or secretary who
does not then give that notice to the Attorney, should not be imputed to
the Attorney's client, especially where the receptionist who signed for
the document was not an agent of the Attorney and was not authorized to
receive such documents for the Attorney.
Improv.

~.

Central Trust Co. v. West India

48 App. Div. 147, 63 N. Y. Supp. 853 ( 1900), reversed without

reference to this point in 169 N.Y. 314, 62 N.E. 387 (1901); Brown v.
Sweet, 7 Ont. App. Rep. 725 (1880); Re Ashton, 64 L. T. N.
28, 39 Week.

S.

(Eng.}

Rep. 320, 8 Morrell 72 (1891).

In this case, the Court imputed the delivery of a copy of the Judgment
to Appellants' former Counsel even though the person who received it was
merely a receptionist in the office building where Appellants'
Counsel rented an office, had no authority to receive mail

former

for Appel-

lants' former Counsel, and did not deliver the Judgment to Appellants'
former Counsel personally. ( R. 243)
POINT IV
APPELLJllHS HAVE A MERITORIOUS CASE WHICH SHOULD BE TRIED ON THE MERITS.
The Plaintiff/ Appellant commenced this

case against Defendants/

Respondents Maurice Richards and Myrtle Bisel on the grounds that Defendant Richards had signed an OFFER TO PURCHASE Jll-JD EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
(R. 6) and an AMENDMENT TO EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT (R. 7) to purchase Unit
86 in building E-8 of the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium complex from Plaintiff, but thereafter defaulted on said agreement.

(R. 2)

Defendant Myrtle Bisel, who subsequently married Defendant Maurice Richards ( R. 353), signed a HOME OWNER'S ACCEPTANCE ( R. 8-9) and thereafter
14

occupied the subject property.

(R. 2)

Both Defendants were given

proper notice to vacate the premises and pay a fair and reasonable amount
of rent during
Without any

the

tenn of occupancy but refused

contract with Plaintiff

Defendant Myrtle Bisel
perty.

to

do so.

(R.

2)

for either services or materials

filed a NOTICE OF LIEN against the subject pro-

( R. 4 and 12)

Defendants filed a late JlN S<IER and COL.NTERCLAIM.

The Law Partner-

ship in which Defendant Maurice Richards is a Partner joined with said
Defendant in
COIJHERCLAIM

filing a THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT.

mo

(R. 18-37)

The JlNS<IER,

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT can be summarized as alleging that

Plaintiff contracted to sell the Three fountains of North Ogden condominium complex to Northern Development Company on May 3, 1976 (R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 4); that Defendant Maurice Richards entered into a Unifonn
Real Estate Contract respecting the above mentioned Unit 86 with Northern
Development Company on May 8, 1976 which provided for Defendant Richards
to utilize the services of Defendant Myrtle (Susie) Bisel (R. 23 and 28,
, 3) to complete and decorate the Unit at buyers expense but with the
cost to be deducted from the selling price.
Law Partnership also claimed credit for legal
Plaintiff, Northern Development Company,
Ogden, Inc.

Defendant Richards and his
services rendered to the

and Three Fountains

of North

(R. 23-26 and 28)

If the Judgment against Appellants is set aside and Appellants are
thus given the opportunity to go to trial on the merits, Appellants will
show that Appellant Wayne Garff told Defendant Maurice Richards that he
(Garff) desired to sell the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium
complex and would pay for his services in helping to locate qualified
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buyers, ect. {R. 153-154)

Mr. Richards never did find qualified buyers.

None of the parties he recommended proved to be financially qualified.
{R. 154)

Although he did spend considerable time negotiating and drafting

various agreements and other legal documents for which he now seeks to
collect legal fees from Appellants Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc., said Appellants never received any billing statements
from Defendant Maurice Richards or Third Party Plaintiff, Richards, Caine
and Richards. (R. 155)

Appellants were unaware of any such claims for

legal services until they received Respondent's ANSo/ER, COLNTERCLAIM /lND
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT.

It should be noted that the billing statement

dated January 13, 1977 was allegedly received by Gary Walker on January
13, 1977. {R. 70, Defendant's Exhibit 10)
May through November 1979".

The statement is "FOR PERIOD:

Thus it appears this document was specially

contrived as an exhibit for trial.
appear to have been contrived.

Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2 also

Although Defendant's Exhibit 1 is pur-

portedly a time sheet for hours worked from January 5, 1976 through
April 17, 1976, it appears that all the entries were made in the same
handwriting in the same ink thus raising a suspicion that the entries
were all made at the same time.

The same can be said for the entries

from May 4, 1976 to November 5, 1976 on Defendant's Exhibit 2.
It is noted that Defendant Maurice Richards was attorney for Gary
Walker and Gus Janis prior to becoming attorney for Appellants.

(R. 322)

Thus Defendant Richards had a serious conflict of interest in trying to
represent all parties but he has presented no document or agreement of
any kind whereby Appellants were put on notice of his conflict of interest or where they agreed to Richards or his Law Firm continuing to repre16

sent them under such circumstances.

REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

OF lliE UTAH STATE BAR, DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 5-105.
Defendant Richards
MONEY AGREEMENT ( R.

6)

had

signed

an

OFFER

TO

PURCHASE

with Wayne Garff Construction, Inc.

AND

EARNEST

on December

31, 1975, which provided for Richards to pay $34,900 for Unit 86.

On May

3, 1976, Wayne Garff Construction, Inc. sold the entire condominium complex to Northern Development Company under a Real
70, Defendant's
322-323).

Exhibit 4)

drafted

by

Five days later, on May 8,

Estate Contract

Defendant Maurice

Richards

( R.
{R.

1976, Defendant Maurice Richards

completed the purchase of Unit 86 by a Uni fonn Real Estate Contract ( R.
10-11) with Northern Development Company on substantially more favorable
terms than provided in the December 31, 1975 OFFER TO PURCHASE AND EARNEST
MONEY AGREEMENT.

The purchase price is reduced to $34,000.00 and buyer

is given the opportunity to complete the Unit at his expense and deduct
his costs

from the purchase price.

Development Company purchased the

(R. 10, 11 3)

At the time Northern

condominium complex from Wayne Garff

Construction, Inc. and completed the sale of Unit 86 to Defendant Maurice
Richards on such favorable terms, its President, Gary Walker knew i t did
not have the capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations to Wayne Garff
Construction, Inc.

(R. 204)

Defendant Maurice Richards knew Appellants were seeking $100,000.00
for their equity in the Three Fountains of North Ogden condominium complex
(R. 335) but the parties (his clients, Gary Walker and Gus Janis) that he
recommended to Appellants breached their contract with Appellants and ran
up debts against the project which Appellants had to satisfy after they
regained possession of the project with the assistance of other counsel.
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(R. 154-155)

The Hold Hannless Agreement oetween Appellants and Northern Development C001pany (R.

70, Defendant's Exhioit 13)

provides in part that:

Gary Walker ... [and] ... Northern Development ... hereoy agree
that they will not settle, compromise, stipulate to or negotiate
any liaoility or cause of action they wish protection or indemnification fr001 oy virtue of this Agreement unless Wayne Garff and
Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc. have oeen notified of such
liaoility or cause of action and have given written authority for
involvement with the settlement or compr001i se of such l i aoil i ty or
cause of action.
It is mutually understood and agreed that such notification to
Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc. shall oe
given oy sending such to Stanley S. Adams, Attorney at Law, at Arrow
Press Square, Glass Factory, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
It is noted that the AASolER-TO THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT (R. 41) filed
oy Gary Walker in oehalf of Northern Development Co. and Three Fountains
of North Ogden states in part:
We deny all allegations. We do not owe Mr. Richards any money.
We no longer have anything to do with Northern Development or Three
Fountains. We sold the Three Fountains oack to Wayne Garff and have
~Held (sic) Hannless Agreement with him. (Emphasis added)
There is no Certificate of Service or Mailing or Return with said
Answer showing the same to have oeen served on Wayne Garff or Wayne
Garff Construction C001pany, Inc. or their then Attorney, Stanley S. Adams.
Wayne Garff never knew such an answer had oeen filed oy Mr. Walker until
he saw it in the Court file on May 18, 1983.

Thus Appe 11 ants never

received notice that Northern Development Company claimed
under the Hold Hannless Agreement and

therefore

should

protection

not

oe held

liaole oy reason of said agreement.
It is noted that although Gary Walker denied all allegations and
denied owing Defendant Richards any money in his answer, he appeared at
trial and testified that Northern Development Company did owe legal fees
18

to Mr.

Richards and his finn.

(R.

345-346) He had no written authority

from Appellants to either file an answer or appear in Court for Northern
Development Company.
no legal

authority

Indeed, inasmuch as he is not an attorney, he had
or

right

to

represent

any

Corporation

in

Court.

If Gary Walker wished protection under the Hold Harmless Agreement
he was required by its terms to notify Wayne Garff and Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc.

This he failed to do and thus he can claim no

protection under the tenns of said agreement.

The Respondents are not

parties to the Hold Harmless Agreement and therefore can claim no rights
by reason of said agreement.

Although Gary Walker and Defendant Maurice

Richards repeatedly claim throughout the record that Three Fountains of
North Ogden, Inc. is a party to the Hold Hannless Agreement, said document
speaks for

itself.

mentioned therein.

Three
(R.

24

Fountains

of North

Ogden,

11 8,

334,

Defendant's

41,

70

Inc.

is

nowhere

Exhibit 13)

Therefore, no valid claim can be made by Respondents against Appellants
under the Hold Harmless Agreement for legal
Fountains of North Ogden, Inc.

rendered to Three

Nevertheless, the District Court awarded

Respondents Judgment against Appellants
Fountains of North Ogden Inc.

services

for

services rendered to Three

because of said Hold Harmless Agreement.

(R. 7311 7, 8, 10, 11)
It is further noted that both Northern Development Company and Three
Fountains of North Ogden,

Inc.

were involuntarily dissolved by the Lt.

Gov./ Sec. of State of the State of Utah on December 29, 1978.
158)

It

is also

longer had
tains."

noted that in his Answer,

" ... anything to do with

(R. 41)

~orthern

Gary

Walker

( R. 157-

stated he

no

Development or Three Foun-

Under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand
19

Gary Walker's interest in being in Court in this matter on June 7, 1982,
some 3 1/2 years after the Corporations had been dissolved and 4 1/2
years after fi 1 i ng his Answer stating he had nothing to do with the
Corporations other than to assist his attorney, Defendant Maurice Richards to obtain a judgment against Appellants for services actually rendered to Wa 1ker.
It is also

noted that Respondent's Counterclaim only asked

for

$7 ,409.78 for Myrtle Bisel (R. 24 f 1) but the District Court erroneously
awarded her Judgment for $18,771.78 (R. 76), or $11,362 more than she
asked for in the complaint even after her attorney conceded that she
received $2,638.00 which was to be deducted from the total judgment. (R.
358, line 17-19)
POINT V
SUBSTANTIAL, IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WILL BE DONE TO APPELLANTS IF 1HE JUDGMENT IS AL LOWED TO ST.AND, WHILE SETTING ASIDE 1H E JUDGMENT WOULD ME RELY
RESTORE 1HE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING STATUS, PERMITTING PROPER PROCEEDINGS
ON 1HE ME RI TS.
The court should note that this case was tried nearly 5 years after
it was filed.

The delays in bringing this case to trial were largely

caused by the Repondents who requested five continuances of trial settings.

The case then went to trial

when Appellants were not present

solely because they had been assured that the case was settled and would
be dismissed.

Judgment of $36,931.78 has been taken against Appellants.

If the court al lows this Judgment to stand, Appellants only recourse
would be against their former counsel

on the grounds that he assured

them that the case was settled and failed to properly represent them.
However, such a claim against Appellants'

former

counsel

would be a

grave injustice to him in light of the District Court's statement in its
20

MEMORPNDUM DECISION that:
Under the facts as stated by plaintiffs affidavit, it could
possibly be construed there was excusable neglect for not appearing
at the time the trial was set. (R. 139)
On the other hand, what damage will be done to Respondents if this
Judgment is set aside?

They will simply be returned to the same position

they were in prior to trial on June 7, 1982.

They are still in a posi-

ti on to assert every claim they asserted on June 7, 1982.
The general rule is that when an order or judgment is vacated
the previously existing status is restored and the situation is the
same as though the order or judgment had never been made.
The
matters in controversy are left open for future detennination. The
action is not thereby discontinued or abated, but is subject to
further proceedings in regular course. The party in whose favor a
judgment has been entered irregularly may, after it has been vacated,
proceed as if it had never been rendered, and in due time and upon
proper proceedings obtain a val id judgment. 1 Freeman On Judgments
(5th Ed.) §302, pp. 594-595; also see Wrang v. Spencer, 4 Conn. Cir.
473, 235 A.2d 861 (1967); 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, §126, p.
641.
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development,

Utah,

611

P.

2d 369

(1980), this Court, after noting that this was a perplexing case in that
the plaintiff and its counsel

had

"proceeded without any impropriety,

including appearing on the trial date and presenting their case" stated:
The unifonnally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord
litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that
can be done without serious injustice to the other party. [Locke
v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955)] To that encl,tlie
courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of default
judgments where there is a reasonable justification or excuse for
the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is
made to set it aside. [See Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company,
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).] Consistent with the objective
just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should be
set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the
end that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of
the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with
law and Justice. [See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897
( 1907); Locke v. Peterson, supra.]
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Application of the principles discussed herein to the instant
situation leads to the conclusion that the interests of justice
will best be served by setting aside the default judgment and giving
the parties that opportunity. In that connection, we call attention
to the prefatory clause of Rule 60(b) that "upon such terms as are
just" a party may be relieved from a judgment. This authorizes the
trial court to impose such terms as may be just as a condition to
setting aside the default.
In its MEMORANDUM DECISION, the District Court noted the" . . . plaintiff had some cause for excusable neglect to set aside the judgment . .
(R. 139)

Therefore, consistent with the policy stated by this Court in

the above case, this Court should resolve any doubt in favor of reversing
the decision of setting aside the judgment in this case.

As was noted by

this Court, the Court has authority to impose such terms as may be just
as a condition to setting aside the default.

Appellants acknowledge that

their former counsel was guilty of a degree of negligence in handling
Appellants' case and therefore the Court may choose to impose appropriate
sanctions on Appellants' former counsel.

However, surely the Court will

agree that allowing a Judgment of $36,931.78 to stand against Appellants
leaving them no recourse except against their former counsel is a grossly
disproportionate penalty

for the

negligence

of their former

counsel.

CONCLUSION
Where Counsel for Respondents has entirely ignored the requirements
of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah by failing to serve the proposed Findings
and Judgment on Appellants'

counsel

before filing

with the court

for

signature and took over two months rather than the required 15 days to
file the Findings and Judgment with the court, substantial grounds exist
on which to set aside the Judgement.
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Where Counsel has thus ignored the

requirements of Rule 2.9, this court should hold that the three months
requirement of Rule 60(b) does not begin to run until the Findings and
Judgment have been served on opposing counsel.
Inasmuch as

the Respondent's MOTION

REHEARING together
under Rule 2.8

with its

of the

IN

OPPOSITION

supporting affidavits

RULES OF PRACTICE

IN

was

TO MOTION
filed

FOR

untimely

THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT

COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, this Court should hold that it was improper
to deny

Appellants'

MOTION

FOR

REHEARING

ON

THIRD-PARTY

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT solely on the ground that Appellants'
initial MOTION

TO

SET ASIDE

JUDGMENT was

filed

untimely.

Litigants

should be treated equally in such matters.
This Court should find that Sylvia Martinez was not an authorized
agent of Counsel

for Appellants and did

service for said Counsel.

not have authority to accept

But even if this Court does find Sylvia Mar-

tinez was Mr. Adams authorized agent, she did not receive service until
September 23, 1982.

Mr. Adams filed his Motion to Set Aside by mail on

December 21, 1982, a date within the three month requirement of Rule 60
( b).

The Appellants have a meritorious case on the merits and should be
given the opportunity for a full hearing on the merits.
Consistent with

the

purpose

of

Rule

60(b)

and

the

uniformally

acknowledged policy of the law as stated by this Court in Interstate
Excavating v. Agla Development, supra,

this

Court

should

resolve

any

doubt in favor of setting aside the judgment on such terms as are just
and allowing Appellants the opportunity to have their side of the case
heard on the merits.

Allowing this ,Judgment
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to stand under all

the

facts of this case would perpetrate an egregious miscarraige of justice.
Appellants plea for Rhadamanthine justice:

Defendant Maurice Rich-

ards should be disciplined for the conflicts of interest and self-dealing
evident throughout the record of this case, rather than oeing allowed to
maintain the $36,931.78 judgment that was awarded to him, his wife and
his law fi nn.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of Septemoer, 1983.

Lorin R. Bl auer
Attorney for Appellants
Certificate of Service
I certify that I delivered a

copy

of the

foregoing APPEL LAN TS'

BRIEF to the attorney for Respondents, Gary Gale, Suite 205, Legal Arts
Building, 2568

Washington Blvd.,

Ogden,

September, 1983.
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Utah 84401

this 20th day

of

